A Fundamental Question Any consideration of Hans Kiing's attitude towards world religions must begin with the "direct question" with which he opens his book: "Why be a Christian?" 1 Naturally, the whole book is his response. But already on the first page of the main text a central ingredient in that response is clearly stated. Küng feels that to make an intelligent choice to be a Christian, a person must be able to affirm, reasonably argue, and claim before the world that "compared with the world religions and humanisms ... Christianity [is] something essentially different, really something special" (p. 25). As Daniel Donovan states: "The whole book is structured around the concepts of 'difference* and 'uniqueness.' " 2 And as becomes clear in the section on Christology, the rock-foundation for this difference and uniqueness is the Christian claim that Jesus of Nazareth is "ultimately decisive, definitive, archetypal 3 for man's relations with God, with his fellow man, with society" (p. 123).
better, I should call them hypotheses. They are tentative and need further scholarly examination. Given the limitations of a short article, I can state them only schematically, frequently merely referring to data which I feel substantiates them.
Therefore I propose that the claim that Christ and Christianity are unique in the sense understood by Küng is: (1) not necessary for Christian identity and living, (2) not conducive to genuine dialogue with other religions, and (3) not possible according to the norms of theological and historical-critical method.
Í. Claims of Uniqueness Not Necessary for
Christian identity and Living
A. Such Claims are not Necessary for Commitment to Christ
This statement contradicts common Christian attitudes and convictions. On the popular as well as the academic level, it is taken for granted that to be fully committed to Christ, he must be the one and only, or at least the definitive and therefore the best Savior and Revealer. Yet today we are forced to ask: is this really so? Intellectually and psychologically, is it not possible to give oneself over wholly to the meaning and message of Jesus and at the same time recognize the possibility that other "saviors" have carried out the same function for other people? Is it not consistent, as John Macquarrie claims, to be fully committed to Christ and at the same time fully open to the salvific significance of other religions? 7 This does not imply simplistically to water down the content of the Christ event and proclaim that all religious leaders are "talking about the same thing." Differences, and therefore uniqueness, are maintained. And thus the universal significance of Jesus is preserved; the difference he makes is felt by Christians to be vitally important for all religions. Yet while holding to this, the Christian can also, I feel, be open to recognize the "vitally important difference" of, for instance, Buddha.
B. Such Claims are not Necessary for Fidelity to Christian Tradition
Fine, some may respond, but what do we do with the fact that such claims for the uniqueness of Christ have been made by Christian tradition, especially in its originating testimony, the New Testament? And Christianity understands itself as a religion grounded in history, therefore bound by fidelity to its past.
A reply to this plunges us into the complexities of the hermeneutical question. Recognizing this, I suggest that especially in the light of recent hermeneutical studies, it can be argued that the claim for Jesus' exclusive uniqueness does not form part of the central assertions of Christian 8 More precisely, while these texts of the New Testament do claim that it is in Jesus of Nazareth that this new mode-of-being-in-the-world is revealed (and this is part of their central assertion), the further claim that this takes place only in him can be said to result from the historically conditioned world view and thought-patterns of the time. Therefore these latter claims do not belong to the core of the Christian message.
To substantiate this assertion properly would move us beyond the limits of these reflections. I can only summarize some arguments which, at the moment, appear to me to demand serious consideration.
(a) Given the prevailing Jewish eschatological-apocalyptic mentality, it was natural that the early Christians should interpret their experience of God in Jesus as final and unsurpassable. Their particular philosophy of history was such that they expected a new and definitive stage; also, it was a stage that was to break forth on the world only from Jerusalem. So when they encountered the overpowering presence of Jahweh in Jesus, the spontaneous conclusion was that this stage had arrived. Furthermore, since at least in the early New Testament writings, the end of history was thought to be immanent, possibilities of other revelations or prophets were simply beyond one's consideration. Is not such an apocalyptic mentality, understood in the literal sense, culturally limited? Must it be taken as part of the essence of the Christ-event? If Jesus had been experienced and interpreted in another philosophy of history, e.g., that of India, would he have been said to be final and unique? 9 (b) As many scholars (as we shall see, Küng is among them) contend, the idea of incarnation was one of the many mythical patterns with which the first Christians tried to articulate the meaning Jesus had for them.
10 Again, we can point out that absolutist claims were a part of this mythical thinking. Jesus, as the incarnation of preexisting divine Wisdom or Logos y was thought to be absolutely unique among all humans. (c) Gregory Baum offers another consideration to explain the histor ically conditioned character of the early church's absolutist language. "I propose that the exclusivist claims of the New Testament, and the proclamation of the early church that apart from its message there is no salvation, were survival language."
12 By this he means that given the historical context in which the communities had to "close ranks" in the face of so much opposition, it was natural for them to speak of Jesus and his "way" as unique. But given an age in which survival is much more secure and relations with other religions are not those of opposition and syncretism but cooperation and dialogue, cannot the meaning of Jesus be articulated without such exclusivist survival language?
(d) A much more general line of argument is based on Bernard Lonergan's distinction between classicist and modern-historical cul tures. Pointing out that culture provides the "beliefs" or general outlook (P. Berger would use the term "plausibility structures") with which people interpret their world, Lonergan describes the radical differences between the beliefs of classicist and modern cultures. The classicist outlook, which for the most part characterized the world of the New Testament and Western civilization until the Enlightenment, took for granted that truth could be only one, unchanging, and therefore norma tive for all. Our modern-historical consciousness, on the other hand, has become aware that all statements of truth are in process, subject to many expressions, and therefore never normative in a once-and-for-all sense.
13
The New Testament writers, therefore, as men of their age, naturally spoke of Jesus in a once-and-for-all, exclusivistic manner. But do these one-and-only claims pertain to the core-content of their message? Can we not speak of the vitally important meaning of Jesus according to the mentality of our historical consciousness?
In light of these sketchy considerations on New Testament interpre tation, I feel that we can. The heart of the New Testament witness is that in Jesus men and women encountered the fullness of God and thus experienced "a complete and true manifestation of the fundamental 
meaning of authentic human existence."
14 This message can be maintained without insistence that he is the only such manifestation.
ÍÍ. Claims of Uniqueness not Conducive to

Dialogue with Religions
This "hypothesis" holds that even though one may be animated by a sincere desire to dialogue with people of other faiths, if one meets them with the kind of claims for the uniqueness of Christ which Küng feels he must make, that dialogue will be essentially hamstrung. This is not to say that one should not bring to dialogue clear positions and prejudgments; not only are such prejudgments unavoidable, they are necessary for effective exchange. But if Küng's insistence on the finality of Christ is one of these clear positions, the dialogue will go nowhere. His chapter on the World Religions is, I feel, an illustration of this. Yet even before this analysis, it seems that Küng has set up his own theological α prions which cannot be contested; all of them stem from the basic α priori that Christ is the final norm for all religions. He takes for granted that the other religions are ways of salvation "only in a relative sense, not simply as a whole and in every sense" (p. 104). (Must not the very same thing be said of Christianity?) He holds that Christianity must claim "absolute validity" and still be "ready to revise its own 14 
A. Dialogue Hindered by Preliminary
B. A Blurred View of Other Religions
Because of his "preliminary assumption" Küng's analysis of the religions is in many respects blurred. To a Buddhist or Hindu, or to someone who has tried to "pass over" to their religious experiences (like Thomas Merton, Raymond Panikkar, John Dunne), Küng's treatment of their teachings frequently seems to be insensitive and/or incorrect, and his evaluations somewhat too facile. One indication that he should have done more thorough study before formulating his evaluations is his glaring mistake, repeated four times, of confusing the dualistic Samkhya school of philosophy (traced back to the seventh century B.C.) with the nondualistic Advaita school of Shankara (eighth century A.D.) (cf., pp.
93, 108, 115, 301).
Other examples: to brand the Hindu experience of maya as a declaration of the world's unreality (p. 108) misses the intent of this doctrine to point out the deeper, hidden meaning of the finite; and to conclude that maya leads to "cosmic pessimism" or "supreme indifference toward the social needs of men" among Buddhists is to leave out of consideration Mahayana's affirmation of the world of samsara as well as Buddha's doctrine of karuna, universal compassion. To accuse the Eastern "cyclical world picture" of predeterminism (p. 107) forgets the Hindu invitation to all to use free will in order to do something about their karma; such a world picture is no more predetermined than the Christian insistence that history is moving towards the parousia. Küng's rather disparaging references to "the grimacing gods of Bali" and the Phallus (p. 102) do not even allow the possibility that these symbols might be as religiously effective as the often grimacing aspect of the crucifix.
More generally, one of the criteria (besides the normativity of Christianity) which Küng uses in his evaluation of the religions is "modernity"-the secularization resulting from modern science and technology (p. 106). True, Eastern religions do have to adapt to our "modern industrial society" (p. 110), just as Christianity, renegingly, had to. Yet, again, Küng's acceptance of the achievements of modernity seems too facile; he might also have pointed out the limit-situations which our growth-oriented technological society have created-problems to which Eastern religions, with their emphasis on interiority and seeing-through-the-material [maya!) f might speak more meaningfully than Christianity can.
Such instances of imprecision might have been avoided, I feel, if Küng were not so certain about his "preliminary assumption" that Christ and Christianity are normative for all other religions. Similar imprécisions are evident when Küng turns from pointing out the deficiencies in the religions to concluding explicitly to Christianity's superiority. His arguments do clarify areas in which other religions can and should criticize and "fulfill" themselves through dialogue with Christianity. Yet none of these arguments indicate finality or absolute normativity for Christian revelation, for in each of these areas it can also be shown how Christianity can and should learn from the religions. In any case, the data Küng assembles for establishing the absolute normativity of Christianity does not appear to be convincing. This brings us to the final hypothesis.
III. Claims of Uniqueness Not Possible According to Norms of Theological and Historical-Critical Method
A. According to the Revisionist Method of Theology
At least in theory, Küng seems to agree for the most part with David Tracy's revisionist model for fundamental theology. This model invites the theologian to carry out a mutually clarifying and critical dialogue between the two sources of Christian theology: "the Christian fact" (scriptural texts and tradition) and "common human experience." 21 Any cognitive claims made by the theologian must be based on both these sources. Küng states the same thing when he explains that his own theological method wants to avoid the extremes of "dialectical theology" (i.e., neo-orthodoxy, based solely on God's Word) and "natural theology" (unduly emphasizing experience and reason [p. 83]). More clearly, he insists that faith statements cannot be grounded exclusively 
B. According to the Historical-Critical Method of scriptural Analysis
One of the hallmarks of Küng's Christology is its insistence on historical foundations; he labors admirably for a Christology "from below." He has little doubt that there is reliable historical data to construct the essence of Jesus' message and the impact it had on his followers. But he goes further. Throughout the book he makes claims that historically we can know the moral perfection of Jesus' life, how he actually lived, his sinlessness, his self-awareness. "We know incomparably more that is historically certain about Jesus of Nazareth than we do about the great founders of the Asian religions" (p. 147). He states that not only did Jesus reveal God's word and will but that in his "life, being and action" he was The chief concern of this paper is to ensure as far as possible that those who continue to make such a claim for the uniqueness of Jesus and speak, for example, of "the new humanity," "the man wholly for others," or "the man wholly for God," are fully aware of the problems involved in making and justifying any such claims ... it is impossible to justify any such claim on purely historical ground, however wide the net for evidence is cast. -436) is one of the most powerful sections of his book, but again one must ask him whether the doctrine of the cross is essentially different from similar insights in other religions. The symbol of the cross calls upon us to embrace, when necessary, the mystery of suffering and to believe that it leads to fuller life. While Buddha did not die on a gibbet, did he not invite his followers to take the risk of living a life of total anatta-no-self and to believe that it will lead to a higher form of existence, one of peace and oneness? And the call of the Bhagavad Gita to act without seeking the fruits of one's actions, is it not a call to a selfless life of trusting love? The crucifix is indeed one of the most powerful symbols with which to confront the mystery of suffering and evil; but it is not the only one. downplaying of the resurrection in our last quotation (p. 410), he does consider it a distinguishing element of Christ's revelation. He makes a theologically defensible case for his interpretation of the Easter event (pp. 370-381). Refusing to appeal to any kind of "supernatural intervention," he views the resurrection not as an "objectified" or a "simple historical fact" but nevertheless as "real." Its reality does not necessarily depend upon belief in the empty tomb or even in certain appearances (p. 371) but upon a "vocation received in faith"-avocation to "shape one's own life out of the effective power of the life of this Jesus as related in the Easter stories" (p. 380). In this sense, it is real; in this sense the Crucified is not dead but lives on. But given the validity of this interpretation (and I think it is valid), can we limit the reality behind the Easter stories only to an experience of Jesus? Is it not essentially what countless men and women have felt in their experience of other archetypal religious leaders? Again, Buddha is an example. Although his followers certainly did not speak of resurrection-that was not a heuristic category in their thought-world-did they not experience a "vocation received in faith" after his death? It was not only a matter of recalling his message but experiencing "the power" ofthat message. This case can be pressed all the more meaningfully in later development of Mahayana when Buddha was deified and given a "glorified body" in the Trikaya doctrine.
Such elements of the Christ event-cross, resurrection, personal God, call to love-are indeed distinguishing features of Christian revelation and are therefore vitally important for all peoples of all time. Yet they are not lacking in other religions, though terminology and symbolism differ. Thus the possibility of claiming absolute uniqueness for Jesus on such grounds appears highly questionable.
The above criticisms of Küng's claim that Christ and Christianity are "essentially different" do not intend to take away from the overall merits of his book. It is, for both academic and popular audiences, one of the most valuable "Summas of the Christian Faith" (p. 20) to be published over the past decades. His case for the relevance of being a Christian in today's world is convincing. My criticism boils down to: it would be just as, if not more, convincing if he avoided such terms as: "only," "essentially different," "normative."
